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Dear President Clinton
CARL TOBIAS*

Congratulations on winning another term as
President!** In discharging the formidable responsibilities of governing, few will be more important
or difficult than judicial selection, a critical duty
which the Constitution assigns you. The President
nominates and, with the Senate's advice and consent, appoints these life-tenured officers who resolve disputes over Americans' fundamental freedoms. Indeed, ten days after you won, Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), who will chair the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 105th Congress, pledged to
"stand firm and exercise the advise and consent
power to insure that President Clinton does not
pack the judiciary with liberal activists who will
make mincemeat of our Constitution and laws." 1
Because the senator believed that many of your appointees issued overly liberal opinions and that reelection concerns no longer restrain you, he found
that "especially careful scrutiny of judicial nominees will be imperative." 2 These ideas may be
post-election political posturing, as the chair recently indicated: "My attitude is Clinton won the
presidency. His job is to nominate and ours is to
confirm, and we should not be making a political
sideshow out of this." 3 The comments resemble
more closely the senator's view after the 1994 elections that the Committee would approve all nominees who were "qualified, in good health, and un*Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Peggy
Sanner for helpful suggestions and Cecelia Palmer for processing
this piece. Errors that remain are mine.
**This article was written in anticipation of President Clinton's
winning re-election in 1996. Therefore, many of the numerical
references in this article were estimations which may or may not
have been borne out by future events.
I. Neil A. Lewis, Utah Senator Scolds Critics of Prosecutor in
Whitewater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 12.
2. Id.
3. See Joan Biskupic, Clinton Given Historic Opportunity to
Trans/orm Judiciary, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1996, at A 19.

derstand the role of judges."4 However, you should
treat his first expression as a wake-up call.
The appointment of federal judges affords you
a valuable opportunity to leave a lasting legacy. A
laudable goal for your second administration would
be filling all of the twenty-six vacancies on the appeals courts and the sixty-seven openings on the
district courts with exceptional judges who bring
gender, racial and political diversity to federal judicial service. The difficult question is how you can
most effectively attain this objective.
I. JUDICIAL SELECTION DURING THE
INITIAL TERM

You compiled an excellent record in choosing
judges.5 You and administration officials who were
responsible for selection enunciated clear goals and
efficacious procedures for achieving them. For example, you publicly stated that appointees would be
very intelligent, have measured temperament, and
enforce constitutional rights while enhancing gender and racial balance. You and your aides also
asked senators to help nominate extremely competent, diverse lawyers. You apparently attained your
selection purposes. During the first term, you
named 202 judges: sixty-two (thirty-one percent)
are women and fifty-seven (twenty-eight percent)
are minorities. 6 They earned the highest rankings
4. See Neil A. Lewis, New Chief of Judiciary Panel May Find
an Early Test With Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A31.
See generally Gary A. Hengstler, At the Seat of Power, A.B.A.J.,
Apr. 1995, at 70.
5. I rely substantially in this section on Sheldon Goldman,
Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
Juo1cATURE 276 (1995); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts
in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996).
6. Telephone interview with Mike Lee, Alliance for Justice,
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 3, 1996). These numbers and percentages
are unprecedented.
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since the American Bar Association (ABA) began
rating candidates in the 1950s7 and possessed all
the qualities critical to exceptional judicial service.
For example, Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Wood
had been the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Many,
such as Second Circuit Judge Pierre Leval, who
was a preeminent federal district judge, had served
on federal or state courts.
Some observers urged that you appoint more
politically partisan or liberal judges to offset the
clear intent of Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George Bush in naming conservatives. 8 You resisted this importuning, characterized your appointees as "mainstream judges" and refused to premise
selection on "rigid adherence to a strict ideological
agenda." 9 Yours is the first administration since
Dwight D. Eisenhower to reduce politicization of
the process. 10
You also deserve praise for filling many of the
113 judicial vacancies which existed when you assumed office. Upon adjournment of the 104th Congress in early October, however, there were eighteen appeals court and forty-four district court
openings, 11 numbers that will increase as active
judges assume senior status. In short, you have
named very able, diverse judges since 1993. Your
administration must attempt to realize even more
success during the next term.

7. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 315; see also, Neil A. Lewis, In
Selecting Federal Judges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse
Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Auo. I, 1996, at A20.
8. See, e.g .. Ted Gest, Disorder in the Courts? Left and Right
Both Gripe About Clinton's Taste in Judges, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 40; Lewis, supra note 7; Anna
Puga, Clinton Judicial Picks May Court the Right, BosTON
GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1995, at I.
9. Biskupic, supra note 3. Senator Hatch even conceded that
Carter "appointees were further to the left" than yours. Id.
10. See Harvey Berkman & Claudia MacLachlan, Clinton's
Picks - Not So Liberal, NAT'L J., Oct. 21, 1996, at Al; Biskupic,
supra note 3; Lewis, supra note I. In fairness, most female and
minority judges may increase political balance. See Jon
Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of
Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U. S.
Court of Appeals, 61 JUDICATURE 165, 168 (1983); Tobias. supra
note 5, at 322; see also Goldman, supra note 5, at 285, 288;
Donald R. Songer et. al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the
Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Court of Appeals, 56 J.
PoL'Y 425 (1994).
11. See interview supra note 6; see also infra note 30 and
accompanying text (suggesting reasons for vacancies); Carl
Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1579, 1580 (when
103rd Congress adjourned, there were fifty-three vacancies).
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II. JUDICIAL SELECTION DURING THE
SECOND TERM
A. Goals and Reasons for Their Attainment
You and your aides should anticipate predictable difficulties and be sufficiently flexible to address unforeseeable problems. You must promptly
reevaluate and consider recalibrating the first-term
selection objectives and then clearly enunciate second-term goals and implement efficacious means
for attaining them. Re-election has freed you to institute policies and practices that you find best for
the courts and the country, as Senator Hatch has
perceptively recognized. 12
One crucial goal is filling all of the present judicial vacancies. Only the full complement of
judges authorized can reduce large civil backlogs in
many districts, promptly resolve increasingly complicated criminal cases, and treat the appellate "crisis of volume." 13 It is critical to appoint judges
who have intelligence, industriousness and balanced temperament to conclude disputes over basic
liberties and growing litigation with scarce resources expeditiously, economically and fairly. 14
You should also continue to enhance gender and racial diversity. Female and minority judges may
help colleagues appreciate complex issues, such as
discrimination, which judges often face; 15 limit
gender and racial bias in the courts; 16 and increase
public confidence in the judiciary by making it resemble more closely society's composition. 17 You,
as well, must rectify the bench's gender and racial
12. See Lewis, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 1580 (discussing district court
backlogs); see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (discussing crisis of volume); RecordSetting Workloads Confront Federal Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH,
July 1996, at 2. Six of 28 seats are vacant on the 9th Circuit
which has the largest appellate docket.
14. Congress could authorize new judgeships, but that
approach is controversial because the need for judges may vary
across appeals courts and districts; diverse measures can treat
dockets; judgeships could seem costly, and you would be able to
name numerous new judges.
15. See, e.g .. Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-Appointed JudgesPerspectives on Gender, ThIAL, Nov. 1990, at 108; Elliot E.
Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising it Higher?, Affirmative
Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1
YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 270 (1983).
16. See REPORT OF THE NINTH Cmcurr GENDER BIAS TASK
FORCE (1992); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 13, at 169; Lynn H. Schafran, Gender Bias in the
Courts: An Emerging Focus for Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
237, 238 (1989).
17. See Slotnick, supra note 15, at 272-73; Carl Tobias,
Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1257,
1276.
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imbalance which Presidents Reagan and Bush fostered.18
You might want to consider enhancing political balance. For example, some have implored
you to choose judges who can counter many Reagan and Bush appointees, such as Supreme Court
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who
were named to make the bench more conservati ve.19 Because the Republican Presidents
single-mindedly sought this objective, you could justify pursuit of the opposite goal, but would incur
criticism similar to that lodged at them. Remember
that highly qualified female and minority judges
might increase political balance because these
judges may differently view certain substantive issues.20

so

B. Attaining Goals
You can best fill the current openings with efficacious procedures. You should appoint additional very competent female and minority judges
by applying that process and by redoubling efforts
which invoke novel approaches or untapped resources. District court appointments deserve emphasis because you have deferred to senators where
the openings arise. 21 Many senators promoted the
candidacies of able women and minorities .. You
should laud them and ask others to institute similar
efforts, publicly reiterating your commitment to
name female and minority lawyers. Your aides and
senators should enlist sources, especially less traditional ones, such as women's groups. You must
also work with the nine female senators, who can
persuade their colleagues to suggest more women
and minorities. Critical are the abilities and contacts of female and minority attorneys, who comprise a fourth of the bar, and of lawyers, such as
Attorney General Janet Reno, and Roberta Ramo,
who was the first female ABA President. 22
18. African Americans were 1.9% of Reagan appointees and
President Bush named one Asian American, although they had
much larger, more experienced pools on which to draw than
President Carter. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 285, 288; Tobias,
supra note 5, at 322.
19. See Gest, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
20. See generally supra note 10.
21. Because your aides have efficaciously achieved your goals
and the White House has controlled nominations of Justices and
circuit judges, their selection deserves terse analysis.
22. See Tobias, supra note 17, at 1248-49 (Naming more
female and minority judges will also increase political balance);
see also supra note 10. You can easily identify others, such as
law faculty and attorneys for public interest groups, who would
increase balance.

You must exercise much diplomacy and political insight, seeking help from members of Congress in both parties. You might rely on Senators
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
who have Judiciary Committee experience, and
respected former solons, such as Senators Howell
Heflin, Sam Nunn, and Alan Simpson. Do not forget eminences, such as William Coleman and Robert Strauss, who have advised Democratic and Republican presidents.
C. Difficult Questions
You must anticipate and resolve several difficult questions which remain. One is whether you
might realize less gender and racial diversity and
political balance to fill the federal courts, and if so,
how much. You could insist on enhanced diversity
while yielding somewhat on political balance because, for example, more diverse judges will inherently foster balance. Moreover, your public views
regarding selection, 23 your political positions during the last two years and the recent campaign, and
the election which was not exactly a mandate for
liberal appointments leave you little flexibility.
You should also consider whether naming lawyers
to offset the ideological perspectives of conservative judges is advisable or even counterproductive.
For instance, jurists, such as your two Supreme
Court appointees, who have moderate views and
measured temperaments, may in fact be more effective in certain situations. 24
Some observers have actually claimed that
your first-term appointments solidified a new centrism whereby the "courts no longer consider their
role as an active solver of society's ills in the way
that past courts advanced criminal defendants'
rights, ensured school desegregation, protected
blacks' voting rights and broke the ground to protect personal privacy from state interference."25
23. See Biskupic, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
24. A related issue is whether you might compromise on
Supreme Court nominees to fill the lower federal courts, and if so,
how much. Enormous symbolic and actual significance attach to
the Court, but it hears so few appeals that the regional circuits
resolve virtually all cases, while district judges' rulings may
actually affect more people than appellate decisions.
25. Biskupic, supra note 3. "The practical effect is to change
significantly the idea that the judiciary will seek with any real
assertiveness to address [social] problems, as [was its] province at
least a decade before," said University of Chicago Provost
Geoffrey Stone. Id.
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This idea seems unrealistic and overstated. For example, the Constitution's general phrasing and the
difficulty of drafting clear statutes mean that judges
will continue to expound the law, and political and
policy factors may well inform this activity. 26
Lawyers and parties will keep requesting judges to
interpret the measures, while Congress cannot
amend the Constitution and has repealed virtually
no legislation under which the suits are brought. 27
Cursory perusal of advance sheets in the federal reporter system reveals many cases that require this
treatment. Attorneys and parties even continue to
pursue institutional reform litigation which is controversial because it asks judges to modify the behavior of large bureaucracies such as schools. 28 In
short, no transformation has occurred, and none
will soon. You, therefore, must appoint judges
who will not shrink from their duty to expound the
law and who appreciate and apply the ideas which
attend the ongoing, vigorous debate over interpretation that ranges from Justice Scalia's textualism to
Professor William Eskridge's dynamic construction.29
You and Senator Hatch must work constructively together. When high-ranking public officials
play politics with judicial selection, they degrade
themselves, the process, the judges who are confirmed, the courts and public discourse. You should
freely consult the chair on selection and on candidates and even seek his counsel, perhaps striking

compromises to secure support for certain goals.
You must deal with the senator because Republicans have a 55-45 majority, but he must cooperate
because you won the election and to avoid appearing overly partisan.
If the chair resists efforts to fill vacancies, you
might mention the pressing needs to treat civil
backlogs and to resolve criminal cases expeditiously, lest accused criminals go free. You could
also gently remind the senator that some actions
during the 104th Congress' second session may
have reflected political gamesmanship. For example, 1976 was the last election year that the Senate
confirmed so few judges. The twenty approved in
1996 sharply contrast with the sixty-six judges confirmed in 1992 and the forty-one judges approved
in 1988 when Senator Biden was chair. 30 In the final analysis, the voters elected you to appoint the
judges. You may need to remind Senator Hatch of
that, and if he persists, take the issue to the American public.

26. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET. AL., Jusnce ON APPEAL 2-4
(1976); see generally William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation ( 1994).
27. Fifty statutes, dubbed "social legislation," even encourage
litigation. See Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights
Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 745, 754-57 (1987).
28. Fewer cases may now exist, but there were never many.
See Richard L. Marcus, Public lAw Litigation and Legal
Scholarship, 21 u. MICH. J. L. REF. 645, 668 (1988); Judith
Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. Rev. 485, 511 (1986).

29. See, e.g., Fort Stewart School v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641
(1990); EsKRIDGE, supra note 26. See generally Nicholas S.

III. CONCLUSION
You compiled an outstanding record of judicial selection during your initial term of office. If
your administration employs efficacious procedures, it should be able to attain even more in the
next four years, and leave a lasting legacy of excellence and diversity on the federal courts.

Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal
Process, 12 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1597 (1991).
30. See Average Time Required to Fill Circuit and District
Judgeships, THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1996, at 4; see also Setting
the Record Straight on Judicial Nominations, 143 CONG. Rec.
S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden).

